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A new strategic relationship between the United States and India is inevitable.  
Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush administration was striving to 
improve relations with India.  After the attacks, this action has become a U.S. priority.  
India, too, is devoting unprecedented energy to improving relations with the United 
States. 
Both countries are now courting each other.  The United States wants a strategic 
partner that is capable of assisting the United States to achieving its international and 
regional objectives.  It seeks a regional partner that can help the U.S. armed forces protect 
and preserve peace and security by providing bases, logistical support and, when 
required, combat support.  India wants to be acknowledged as a regional power, as a 
nuclear power, and to more actively participate in global affairs, without sacrificing 
sovereignty.  The two countries have pursued a strategic partnership before but the results 
have been failure and heightened resentment.  Will this time be any different? 
This thesis examines the prospects for an enduring U.S.-India strategic 
partnership.  It analyzes the history of U.S.-India relations, and describes the conditions 
that impeded the development of strong relations between the two countries.  It describes 
the negative impact of Pakistan and Kashmir on U.S.-India relations.  It demonstrates that 
a new reality, based upon capability and cooperation, has replaced the Cold War reality 
of power and bloc alignment, and why that bodes well for the future of U.S.-India 
relations.  And it recommends that: the U.S.-India Defense Planning Group and its 
subsidiaries are revived; the Memorandum of Understanding be reviewed and simplified; 
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A new strategic relationship between the United States and India is inevitable.  
Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush administration was striving to 
improve relations with India.  After the attacks, this action has become a U.S. priority.  
India, too, is devoting unprecedented energy to improving relations with the United 
States. 
Both countries are now courting each other.  The United States wants a strategic 
partner that is capable of assisting the United States to achieving its international and 
regional objectives.  It seeks a regional partner that can help the U.S. armed forces protect 
and preserve peace and security by providing bases, logistical support and, when 
required, combat support.  India wants to be acknowledged as a regional power, as a 
nuclear power, and to more actively participate in global affairs, without sacrificing 
sovereignty.  The two countries have pursued a strategic partnership before but the results 
have been failure and heightened resentment.  Will this time be any different? 
India is an emerging power.  It has a strong military, diplomatic corps, and 
economy.  India also has a strong tradition of international involvement as well as a 
history of leadership in the Third World.  Even though there have been difficult times in 
Indian domestic politics, India’s commitment to democracy endures.  For these reasons, 
India deserves serious consideration for a strategic partnership. 
A historical review of U.S.-India relations reveals several conflicts of interest 
between the two states.  The complications primarily center upon the Cold War, the 
United States and India had differing worldviews.  The foreign policy of the United 
States was driven by realism; a world divided between blue and red, where the goal was 
to contain the red expansion.  Indian foreign policy was based upon morals, Nehruvian 
ideals of right and wrong.  Additionally, successive Indian prime ministers dominated 
Indian foreign policy, often personalizing it.  The outcome was a mutual feeling of 
mistrust. 
 xiii
Multinational cooperative agreements and fora have replaced the old system of 
alliances.  The old structure was power based: the major powers had the largest voice and 
the smaller powers were often unheard.  The new structure is capability based: states are 
ordered by what they offer within a specific framework.  In this new structure, India, as a 
dominant regional power, has the potential to play a significant role in the U.S.-led global 
security and economic system. 
India will cooperate with the United States because the benefits outweigh the 
costs.  It seeks to continue its economic, social, and scientific development without 
sacrificing its ability to act independently.  It seeks regional stability.  India strives for a 
minimum deterrent capability vis-à-vis Pakistan and China as well as U.S. assurances of 
assistance should it be attacked.  India also seeks military modernization.  However, India 
is concerned that cooperation will interfere with its ability to act independently. 
With or without India, the United States will develop its new strategic framework.  
It will decrease its nuclear arsenal, create a missile defense, and pursue new approaches 
to nonproliferation and counterproliferation.  The inclusion of India will ease some of the 
burden on U.S. armed forces.  The United States wants logistical support.  It wants access 
to bases, airfields, ports, and repair facilities.  It wants access to training facilities as well 
as increased training opportunities.  And finally, it wants the support of the Indian Navy 
in protecting the commercial shipping as well as U.S. Navy ships in the event of conflict. 
A strategic partnership between the United States and India can emerge: the key 
lies in recognizing that a new reality exists and that the difficulties of the past hold less 
relevance.  U.S.-Pakistan relations still have the potential to disrupt U.S.-India relations.  
Similarly, until the Kashmir issue is resolved by India and Pakistan, U.S. policy in South 
Asia is susceptible to failure.  The United States must strike a delicate balance in its 
South Asia foreign policy; it must insist that India and Pakistan continue to work towards 
a resolution of the Kashmir issue while insulating U.S.-India relations from Pakistan.  
The future should be founded upon the cooperative frameworks that already exist 
between the United States and India: space, defense, information technology, economic, 
and counterterrorism.  These frameworks need to be adapted to the new reality and 



























A new U.S.-India relationship is inevitable.  The Bush administration assumed 
office in January 2001 asserting that the opportunity existed for a new and improved 
relationship with India.  On 6 April 2001, Jaswant Singh, serving as India’s Minister for 
both External Affairs and Defense, visited the United States and was received with full 
military honors; the first time since 1992 that such a reception had been accorded to an 
Indian dignitary.1  Mr. Singh also had an unscheduled forty-five minute discussion with 
President Bush in the Oval Office.2  Since that visit, numerous high-level official visits 
have occurred both in Washington, D.C. and New Delhi.  Additionally, President Bush 
has accepted an invitation to visit India.  A final signal of the impending policy shift 
occurred on 22 September 2001 when President Bush signed a Presidential 
Determination lifting the economic sanctions placed upon India and Pakistan after the 
1998 nuclear tests. 
India, too, is striving to improve relations with the United States.  India has also 
supported the Bush Administration’s plan for ballistic missile defense policy.  It has been 
receptive to enhanced military-to-military cooperation with the United States.  India fully 
supports the war against terrorism.  In support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it 
has offered to share intelligence as well as the use of its bases and airfields to house 
fighter planes and refuel long-range bombers.3  This marks only the second time in 
history that this has occurred; the first time was for refueling U.S. military transport 
flights during the Gulf War.   
These new developments indicate that, once again, the United States and India 
feel the need to cooperate.  According to a senior Indian government official in 
Washington, “We’re now looking at each other with a view that we have an increasing 
                                                 
1 Jason Sherman,  “Rumsfeld Orders Action To Restore Military Contacts,” Defense News (23 April 
2001): 3. 
2 Ben Barber, “U.S., India Restore Cooperation By Militaries,” The Washington Times (3 May 2001): 
1. 
3 Brahma Chellaney, “India’s Strategic Shift,” Asian Wall Street Journal (1 October 2001). 
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number of things in common.”4  The two countries have been here before, on more than 
one occasion, and each attempt has ended in disappointment.  Will this time be any 
different? 
B. BACKGROUND 
India has always possessed the components that are required to make a strong 
state.  Indeed, from the outset, its foreign policy has stressed that fact and insisted upon 
the ability to maintain independence in global affairs.  However, Indian foreign policy 
has often come into conflict with the policies and actions of the United States.  This 
section briefly discusses the capabilities that make India a strong state, and therefore the 
reasons its partnership is desired.  It also introduces a brief history of U.S.-India relations, 
focusing on the conditions that have complicated U.S.-India relations. 
1.  Why India is a Strong Candidate for Strategic Partnership 
If the U.S. armed forces are going to continue their rapid pace of deployments and 
continued global presence, they will require assistance to keep from being spread too 
thin.  India’s military is the largest in the South Asian region with a combined strength of 
approximately 1.2 million personnel.  The army is the largest of India’s three services at 
nearly 1.1 million personnel.  The Indian Air Force (IAF) consists of approximately 
115,000 personnel, and there are roughly 55,000 members serving in the Indian Navy.5  
Additionally, there are approximately 347,000 members in the paramilitary forces and an 
army reserve component of roughly 250,000 personnel.6  In addition to its conventional 
strength, India possesses nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by either aircraft or 
short- to medium-range missiles.  India also has a robust defense research and 
development program that is engaged in missile, nuclear submarine, aircraft carrier, and 
aircraft programs.  Finally, India is not content with the status quo, its military constantly 
seeking to modernize; in the 2000 budget, 3.32 percent of India’s GDP (US$13.6 billion) 
was allocated for defense, a 28 percent increase over the previous year.7 
                                                 
4 Sherman, “Rumsfeld Orders Action To Restore Military Contacts,” 3. 
5 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Modernizing the Indian Armed Forces,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 2000): 
19. 
6 Ibid. 
7 South Asia Monitor, Number 20 (1 April 2000).  http://www.csis.org/saprog/sam20.html  
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If America’s prosperity truly depends upon the prosperity of others, then India 
deserves serious consideration for partnership.  India’s economy is fairly robust and 
growing at a greater rate than the other countries in the region.  In 1999 India had the 13th 
largest GDP in the world (US$390 billion), of which industry comprised 26 percent and 
services accounted for 48 percent; its real growth rate for that year was 6.8 percent.8  The 
United States is India’s largest trading partner and nearly 40 percent of America’s 
Fortune 500 companies outsource their software needs to Indian companies.9 
India is an important actor in the international arena.  Even though it is not one of 
the Permanent Five (P-5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
India frequently has been a key player in both the UNSC and the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA).  India has always been a strong voice for the Third World and the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  The Indian culture is not only a strong influence in 
South Asia; it has spread to Southeast Asia, Africa, and even the Americas.  Finally, 
India has exceptional regional influence and significant international leverage: 
• Nepal and Bhutan primarily export to and import from India; 
• Bangladesh is heavily dependant for water on India’s Gangetic River 
System; 
• Pakistan’s source of river water supply originates in, or passes through, 
India; 
• Sri Lanka and the Maldives are closer to India than any other country, and 
have a strong ethnic Indian presence; 
• India is the most politically stable country in the region; 
• India’s size, military power and international clout positions her as a 
regional protector, economic assistant, and service provider (medical, 
educational, employment).10 
Additional factors weigh heavily in India’s favor.  They can all facilitate the 
building of a durable framework allowing the relationship between the United States and 
                                                 
8 Department of State, Background Notes: India (March 2000).  
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/india_0003_bgn.html 
9 Robert Blackwill, U.S. Ambassador to India, “The Future of US-India Relations,” speech delivered 
in Mumbai, India to the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce and Indo-American Society on 6 
September 2001.  http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/index.cfm?docid=4850 
10 Harish Kapur, India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-1992: Shadows and Substance (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1994), 89-90. 
3 
India to prosper now and in the future.  India is the seventh largest country in the world, 
in terms of landmass.  At 3.3 million square kilometers, it is roughly 1/3 the size of the 
United States.  While India occupies only 2.4 percent of the world’s landmass, with a 
population slightly over one billion it supports 15 percent of the total world population 
and is soon expected to exceed China.11 
The Indian Ocean is the major sea line of communication connecting Asia to 
Africa and the Middle East.  It is both a lifeline and a strategic waterway and India nearly 
bisects it.  Vast amounts of oil flow through the Indian Ocean bound for ports in Japan, 
Korea, China, and Southeast Asia often stopping in India along the way; every year half 
of the 62,000 vessels transiting the Indian Ocean visit Indian ports.12  Additionally, large 
reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals are being tapped in the Indian Ocean Basin.  It is 
estimated that approximately 40 percent of the world’s offshore oil production is, or can 
be, derived from the Indian Ocean Basin.13 
India possesses many of the characteristics of a strong state.  It has a strong 
military, diplomatic corps, and economy.  India also has a strong tradition of international 
involvement, through the United Nations (UN) and the NAM and it has credibility within 
the Third World.  And even though there have been difficult times in Indian domestic 
politics, India’s commitment to democracy endures.  For these reasons, and many more 
below the geo-strategic level of analysis, India deserves serious consideration for a 
strategic partnership. 
2.  Brief History of U.S.-India Relations 
A brief historical review reveals that the relationship between the United States 
and India has often passed through difficult phases.  The two countries have routinely 
clashed over such issues as Third World development, economic and trade policies, and 
nuclear proliferation.  Additionally, the United States has been assertive in achieving its 
                                                 
11 Dept. of State, Background Notes: India. 
12 Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun, “China NDU Professor Views India’s Military Power,” Beijing 
Guangming Ribao, Internet Version (15 November 2000). 
http://cnsinfo.miis.edu/search97se…late+pnewsdoc.hts&&Collection=FBIS  
13 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2001, March 2001. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
4 
foreign policy goals, acting either unilaterally or multilaterally.  India has been less 
inclined to take sides, preferring to maintain the ability to act independently. 
First and foremost among the complicating factors has been Pakistan.  The three-
way relationship between the United States, India and Pakistan was, and still is, riddled 
with pitfalls.  One example that India continues to remember was the decision of 
President Nixon to send the USS ENTERPRISE Battle Group, Task Force 74, into the 
Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.  Secretary of State of Henry Kissinger 
explained the USS ENTERPRISE deployment as a move to assist Pakistan as well as 
China.  Meanwhile, to many Indians, this was yet another example of American gunboat 
diplomacy, it was not only an overt threat, but a nuclear one as well.14 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also complicated U.S.-India relations.  
Initially, India and the United States were of different opinions; while India was signing 
friendly agreements based upon Panch Sheel with the PRC, the United States was 
offering full support, to include nuclear threats against Mainland China, to the 
Kuomintang Government on the island of Taiwan.  In 1972, there was a role reversal.  
President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger broached friendly relations with the 
PRC, while India was growing more concerned, having lost the 1962 Sino-Indian border 
war. 
Nonproliferation also created foreign policy conflict between the United States 
and India.  As the United States was struggling to deal with the repercussions of the new 
nuclear era, India was creating an independent nuclear program.  While Indian policy 
remained unchanged throughout the Cold War, the various U.S. Administrations viewed 
proliferation issues differently, as well as varying its level of importance.  Caught in the 
middle of all of these changing policies was India’s Tarapur Atomic Power Station 
(TAPS).   
In the spirit of the Atoms for Peace Program, the United States assisted India with 
the construction of TAPS.  The conflict began once the project was completed in 1974; 
India originally opposed safeguards but was coerced into accepting them in return for 
                                                 
14 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 313 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 25. 
5 
continued fuel supplies.  As part of the original agreement, India was supposed to operate 
a reprocessing facility in conjunction with TAPS.  However, as nonproliferation concerns 
gained importance the United States denied India the remaining resources required for 
reprocessing. 
The final significant complication in U.S.-India relations during the Cold War 
was non-alignment.  A product of Prime Minister Nehru’s ideology, non-alignment was 
perceived as a way in which India was seen playing both sides against each other, while 
maintaining the ability to act independently.  However, several key United States policy 
makers viewed this as a ruse; Secretary of State Dean Acheson was one of the foremost 
critics of non-alignment, claiming India was soft on communism. 
With the Cold War over, India continues to strive for achieving the status as a 
nuclear power, which is yet to be acknowledged.  However, the latest statements 
emerging from the United States and other Western countries indicate a sense of 
accommodation for India’s nuclear status.  This shift has helped in removing this major 
irritant from the U.S.-India relationship.   Furthermore, the United States does not place 
the same geo-strategic importance on relations with Pakistan it once did.  The end of the 
Cold War also has removed the stigma that was attached to non-alignment.  No longer 
must a country choose sides in the Blue versus Red conflict of the past; there is no longer 
a global contest, just globalism. 
C. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the prospects for an enduring U.S.-India strategic 
partnership.  A strategic partnership between the United States and India can emerge: the 
key lies in recognizing that a new reality exists and that the difficulties of the past hold 
less relevance.  In doing so, certain questions that arise are: Why have the United States 
and India been unable to create an enduring partnership before now?  What conditions, if 
any, have changed that increase the probability of successful cooperation?  How much 
cooperation can be expected from each country?  Are there any actions or policies that 





This thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter One introduces the current 
environment, gives a brief background, and outlines the thesis, its questions, 
methodology, and organization.  Chapter Two analyzes U.S.-India relations since 1947; it 
focuses on the conditions that have prevented the United States and India from reaching a 
partnership.  Chapter Three reviews the recent changes that have occurred which are once 
again bringing the United States and India into agreement.  Chapter Four outlines the 
reasons why India desires a strategic partnership, as well as the concerns it has over such 
a drastic policy shift.  Chapter Five outlines the reasons why the United States wishes to 
engage India and the concerns that exist regarding India as a partner.  Chapter Six 
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II. COMPLICATIONS IN U.S-INDIA RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has had periods of strong interest in India as well as periods of 
indifference.  Chapter One introduced reasons why India would be a good partner.  If 
India is so significant to the success of U.S. foreign policy, then why has not a 
partnership emerged prior to this?  This is a simple question that must be answered in 
order to break the cycle of on again-off again relations. 
In order to prevent history from repeating itself, the history of U.S.-India relations 
must be known and understood.  This chapter examines the history of U.S.-India 
relations.  The first section covers the Cold War years, 1947-1988, while the second 
section covers more recent events, 1989-2000.  The questions driving this analysis are: 
What were the significant conflicts in U.S.-India relations? And, what conditions created 
those conflicts? 
The analysis reveals that multiple levels of interaction, global, regional, and 
individual, created the complications in U.S.-India relations.  At the global level, the 
United States and India differed ideologically.  At the regional level, competing interests 
and relations with China and Pakistan caused periods of intense displeasure.  At the 
individual level, successive Indian prime ministers dominated Indian foreign policy 
during the Cold War; Nehru and Indira Gandhi were prone to personalize Indian foreign 
policy.  Understanding these conditions, so as to prevent their repetition, is the first step 
to ensuring an enduring U.S.-India strategic partnership. 
B. U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA: DURING THE COLD WAR 
1. Truman Administration (1945-1953) 
At the outset, South Asian foreign policy was low on the list of priorities.  The 
United States was more concerned with rebuilding Europe, containing Communism and 
the sinking fortunes of Chang Kai-shek in China.  Only when conflict erupted in 1947 in 
the princely state of Kashmir did the region appear on the foreign policy radar. 
India was dismayed when the United States sided with Great Britain in pressing 
for the creation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).    
9 
While the United States was focused upon devising a viable solution, India was upset at 
the failure of the United States and the UN to identify Pakistan as the aggressor. Indian 
Prime Minister Pandit Nehru labeled the reactions of the United States and the United 
Kingdom as, “completely wrong” and that, “The U.S.A. and the U.K. have played a dirty 
role.”15 
Despite Indian efforts to the contrary, the United States kept the issue alive in the 
UNSC from 1948 through 1953.  The solution proffered by the United States was based 
largely upon the McNaughton Plan, which called for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and a 
plebiscite.  According to Josef Korbel, former UNCIP chairman, India was opposed to 
such a measure, primarily on the grounds of ideology: 
The struggle for Kashmir is in every sense another battle in this continuing struggle and 
by now irrational war of ideals.  In the minds of Nehru and the Congress, Kashmir is, in 
miniature, another Pakistan, and if this Muslim nation can be successfully governed by 
India, then their philosophy of secularization is vindicated.16 
 
A second source of conflict was the personal style of Prime Minister Nehru; he 
placed a great amount of emphasis on personal relations.  Therefore, he was distressed by 
critical remarks from such key players as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles.  Nehru 
also felt that Pakistan continually received a warm and gracious welcome as compared to 
India.  According to him, “They go through the same routine whether it is Nehru or the 
Shah or Liaquat Ali….  It does appear that there is a concerted attempt to build up 
Pakistan and build down, if I may say, India.”17 
There were other sources of conflict that emerged during this period, which 
prevented improvement in U.S.-India relations.  U.S. failure to follow through on food 
aid in 1949 and 1950 drew ire from the Indians, who turned to the Soviet Union for 
assistance.  India and the United States also disagreed over continuing the war in Korea; 
India was one of two non-communist countries to oppose the resolution condemning the 
Chinese aggressors.18  Arms sales to India during this period were also unpredictable. 
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A pattern of inconsistency emerged over the course of the Harry S. Truman 
administration.  The United States alternately demonstrated a willingness and lack of 
enthusiasm for economic and military assistance.  Similarly, the diplomacy directed 
towards India alternated between friendly and adversarial.   Underlying all of this was a 
feeling of disappointment; the United States was disappointed that India would not align 
itself with the West, while Indian were upset that the United States would not support 
another democratic country. 
2. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) 
When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the office of the President of the United 
State he promised a tougher stance abroad.  To support his tougher and more active 
foreign policy, Eisenhower promoted John Foster Dulles to fill the position of Secretary 
of State.  As Eisenhower’s primary foreign policy advisor, Dulles echoed the President’s 
position; fighting communism was the primary concern.   
Dulles favored collective security arrangements in the fight against communism.  
In light of the Korean War, this concept was immediately applied to South Asia.  After 
visiting the region in May 1953, Dulles announced the creation of the Baghdad Pact, to 
include Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.  According to Dulles, Pakistan was chosen over India 
because, “…Pakistan is one country that has the moral courage to do its part resisting 
communism.”19  Furthermore, Dulles was highly skeptical of India’s policy of 
neutralism, going so far as to call it immoral.20  Upon hearing the statements from Dulles 
India was understandably upset, especially because he had avoided the issue in his talks 
with Nehru in New Delhi.21 
India’s official acknowledgement of the PRC was also a setback in U.S.-India 
relations.  Having argued in favor of the PRC sitting on the UNSC during the Korean 
War was only the first step.  Nehru followed that by allowing Premier Chou En-lai to 
visit New Delhi in the summer of 1954.  During that visit, India and China signed a 
mutual agreement of non-interference and respect based upon the Five Principles, or 
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Panch Sheel.  India deemed these actions critical to reduce its security concerns, to the 
displeasure of the United States. 
Pakistan continued to pose problems for the relationship between the United 
States and India.  It increased its support for and alignment with the United States by 
allowing the United States to conduct intelligence gathering U-2 flights from the airfield 
at Peshawar.  In return, Pakistan received significant military assistance.  This aid to 
Pakistan was balanced with offerings to India, but the items offered were such that they 
could not alter the balance.  Nehru was highly critical of the U.S. network of alliances, 
saying that the United States was unable to, “think of anything else but getting bases all 
over the world and using their money power to get manpower elsewhere to fight for 
them.”22  To many in India, the antics of the United States were akin to colonialism. 
India viewed U.S. military assistance to Pakistan as an attempt to influence Indian 
neutralism.  Nehru went so far as to publicly admonish the United States for introducing 
arms into the region.  It was his opinion that U.S. foreign policy was bringing the Cold 
War to the region instead of keeping it out: 
A military pact between Pakistan and the U.S. changes the whole balance in this part of 
the world and affects India more especially.  The U.S. must realize that the reaction in 
India will be that this arming of Pakistan is largely against India or might be used against 
India, whether the U.S. wants that or not…. They imagine that such an alliance between 
Pakistan and the U.S. would bring such overwhelming pressure on India as to compel her 
to change her policy of nonalignment.  That is a rather naïve view because the effect on 
India will be just the opposite, that is, one of greater resentment against the U.S.23 
 
India edged closer to the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. policy decisions relating 
to South Asia.  India also began to seek improvement of its relations with Communist 
China.  Meanwhile, India stepped up it rhetoric through the NAM, capitalizing upon 
relations with Africa and Southeast Asia.  Further complicating matters was the fact that 
India failed to condemn Soviet actions in Hungary while it was simultaneously chastising 
France and Great Britain for their aggressive actions in the Suez crisis.  The Kashmir 
issue continued to create trouble for U.S.-India relations; Eisenhower kept the issue alive 
in the UN and India continued to refuse outside influence.   
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3. Kennedy Administration (1961-1963) 
While most of President John F. Kennedy’s term saw successes in U.S.-India 
relations, several detractors appeared.  In India, the expectations for improved relations 
with the United States were high because Kennedy was a well known as an advocate of 
greater aid, support and attention to India.  He had established this reputation while 
serving as a United States Senator. 
However, the expectations did not match the reality.  The mood of American 
domestic politics shifted away from foreign aid.  Nehru complicated matters through his 
statements and actions regarding the Berlin Crisis of 1961.  These, and other factors, 
combined to negatively affect the quality of aid directed towards India: the cost of 
bolstering the Indian defense establishment to meet the Chinese threat was determined to 
be excessive; U.S.-Pakistan agreements and understandings limited the scope of a U.S.-
India relationship; U.S. pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute was continually 
met with Indian resistance.24  
During the Sino-Indian border war, the Kennedy Administration sought to take 
advantage of the situation to improve relations with India, but Pakistan strongly objected.  
The result was a limited military assistance package, items primarily for mountain 
warfare and not sufficient enough to swing the military balance away from Pakistan. 
India’s invasion of Goa adversely affected relations with the United States.  India, 
having worked with the United States, and through the UN on recent issues, took 
unilateral action in the Portuguese colony.  This caught the President off-guard, putting 
him in an awkward situation.  While the military action between India and Portugal was 
brief and bloodless, the diplomatic encounter between the United States and India was 
anything but brief.25 
The issue of Kashmir also added to the friction between the two countries.  As it 
had in the previous administrations, the United States continued to push for the 
implementation of UN resolutions, specifically the plebiscite in the Kashmir valley.  
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India continued to rebuff UN efforts, claiming that the issue could only be settled 
bilaterally. 
4. Johnson Administration (1963-1969) 
The Lyndon B. Johnson administration did not continue Kennedy’s initiatives in 
South Asia.  Rather, his foreign policy towards India was dominated by practicality.  On 
the issue of arms sales to India, he deemed that the sale of supersonic F-104’s could only 
be harmful.  A transfer of such military importance would alter the delicate balance 
between India and Pakistan, and could rupture the U.S.-Pakistan alliance.  It was also an 
expensive package at a time when India was experiencing difficulty feeding its people.  
Even though the possibility existed that refusal would push India towards a Soviet 
alternative, the United States had to support its ally. 
Johnson’s personal convictions also affected food aid to India.  Because he was 
unconvinced by India’s efforts to solve its food problems he put India on a “short-tether.”  
At the President’s insistence the PL-480 commitments were renewed only on a yearly 
basis.  When the he personally became convinced that India was exerting an all-out effort 
he relented and allowed more food aid to flow.  India was deeply angered by Johnson’s 
tough love; Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and much of the public sector felt their 
sovereignty was being attacked.26 
The second Indo-Pak war negatively impacted U.S.-India relations.  As in the first 
Indo-Pak War, the United States favored UN efforts to bring the conflict to an end.  The 
damage occurred when the Johnson administration ceased military aid to both countries 
and essentially walked away from the region; India had become dangerously frustrated 
and Pakistan had become dangerously overconfident.27 
The Johnson administration was forced to focus more closely on nonproliferation 
after China tested a nuclear device.  The administration became determined that India 
would not follow China’s footsteps.  For this, the United States worked closely with the 
Soviet Union to create the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  India felt the NPT 
was discriminatory.  It created a class of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” it ensured a 
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monopoly, and choosing 1964 as a deadline for nuclear weapons attainment was 
arbitrary.  Furthermore, when India attempted to secure a UN sponsored nuclear 
guarantee against PRC aggression, both the United States and the Soviet Union balked at 
the idea.28   
Despite the combined efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, neither 
country could convince India to become a signatory.  For India, the decision was 
straightforward; it would have to defend itself.  In the instance, India’s non-alignment 
had left it isolated. 
Unlike the previous two administrations, the Johnson administration treated India 
with practicality and pragmatism.  All aid to India became a tool for attempting to create 
reform.  Rather than try to seduce India, the Johnson administration was more coercive.  
Foreign aid flowed through a valve, which could be turned on or off as the President saw 
fit.  India was simply one of many Third World countries demanding aid. 
5. Nixon Administration (1969-1974) 
Opening China was Richard M. Nixon’s primary focus.  This focus, and the 
manner in which it was carried out, alienated India.  Washington’s flip-flop on China was 
devastating; after having aided India in its war against China, the United States was now 
using China as a counter-weight against the Soviet Union.29  With nowhere else to turn, 
India looked to the Soviet Union for increased assistance. 
Nixon’s response to India’s strengthening Soviet ties was predictable.  Seeing that 
Indira Gandhi was warming to assistance from the Soviet Union, Nixon changed his 
stance on Pakistan.  In the fall of 1970, Nixon approved a “one-time exception” and 
agreed to sell arms to Pakistan.  A package of $50 million was offered, which included 
armored personnel carriers and aircraft.30 
The years during the Nixon Administration could almost be categorized as action-
reaction.  As India softened its stance and began to lean more towards the Soviet Union, 
the United States responded by aiding Pakistan.  Because of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 263. 
29 Cohen, India, 275. 
30 Kux, India and the United States, 284. 
15 
and the opening of China, India required balance in the region and signed the Indo-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty in 1971.   
Antagonism and animosity seemed to replace maturity and sound decision-
making.  President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi seemed to take every action as a personal affront.  For example, despite U.S. 
objections, Indira Gandhi elevated the Consulate General in Hanoi to the level of 
Embassy as well as ordering the closing of the U.S. economic assistance mission and 
reducing the number of Peace Corps volunteers in the country.31 
The most troubling development of the Nixon years was the U.S. response to the 
1971 Indo-Pakistan war.  According to U.S. sources, Task Group 74, headed by the USS 
ENTERPRISE, was ordered to the Bay of Bengal to assist with the possible evacuation of 
U.S. personnel in Dacca.32  The true intentions of the United States were widely debated 
and vary considerably depending upon the source.  Regardless of the true motive, the 
result was another setback in U.S.-India relations.  Throughout the rest of the Cold War, 
India claimed that the nuclear extortion of the United States was one of the underlying 
factors in their decision to acquire nuclear weapons, which was achieved on 18 May 
1974. 
6. Ford Administration (1974-1977) 
The Gerald Ford administration continued with the previously established policy 
of selling arms to Pakistan.  While there was a concerted effort to improve U.S.-India 
relations, sale of military hardware to Pakistan worked as a major irritant.  Pakistan 
desperately wanted to purchase weapons from the United States and Secretary of State 
Kissinger was apt to comply.   
Given the back and forth, and up and down, in U.S.-India relations, the 1974 test 
of India’s peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) appears to be an anomaly.  What should have 
been a serious setback turned out to be only a bump in the road.  It had been known that 
India was close, but for Ford and Kissinger the nuclear tests were a fact of life, readily 
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explainable by the concept of power politics.33  Accordingly, Kissinger chose to keep 
matters low-key; while supplies for the TAPS were briefly delayed, no sanctions or 
punishments were meted out.  The only damage that resulted from this incident was the 
betrayal felt by those who had supported India for so long coupled with a downturn in 
public opinion. 
Some experts are of the opinion that Ford’s lack of foreign policy experience 
prohibited him from improving relations with India.  Because of his inexperience, he 
relied heavily upon Secretary of State Kissinger.  This dependence upon a person who 
had previously demonstrated antagonistic tendencies tainted every attempt to improve 
relations.  As a demonstration of her disdain for Kissinger, Indira Gandhi had a brief 
lunch with him and then abruptly departed for Kashmir in a calculated snub.34  At the end 
of his tenure, the situation was no better or worse than when he had assumed office. 
7. Carter Administration (1977-1981) 
While President Jimmy Carter significantly improved U.S.-India relations, pitfalls 
remained.  The first difficulty struck to the core of Carter’s agenda.  India was very upset 
with the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA) passed by the United States 
Congress.  After serious negotiations India reluctantly agreed to safeguards on the 
nuclear power plants that had been built with the assistance of outsiders.  This meant that 
the stations at Tarapur and Rajasthan would come under international safeguards, but 
indigenous nuclear plants were not part of the agreement. 
In response to India’s obstinacy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) split 
on a vote to transfer fuel to India.35  Created by a reorganization of U.S. nuclear 
activities, the NRC was established as an independent body responsible for licensing 
nuclear technology for sale and export.  Sensing that all of the positive improvements 
were about to unravel, Carter was forced to overturn the NRC ruling.  Justifying his 
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actions, Carter acknowledged that withholding the fuel would seriously undermine the 
delicate nonproliferation efforts that were already in progress.36 
Nonproliferation soon became the key sticking point in U.S.-India relations.  The 
original plans for TAPS included reprocessing.  However, because India had 
demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability, the issue of reprocessing became 
problematic.  A dilemma arose: India would not be allowed to reprocess its own spent 
nuclear fuel and because they would not submit to full scope safeguards they could not 
receive new fuel supplies from the United States.  Matters became even more 
complicated when evidence began to surface that Pakistan had embarked upon its own 
nuclear weapons program. 
As with every previous administration, arms to Pakistan again caused a problem 
for U.S.-India relations.  In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the United 
States revived its bilateral security commitment to Pakistan.  Despite Indian complaints, 
the Carter Administration pressed forward with a $400 million military assistance 
package.37  However, signaling another policy shift, Carter simultaneously offered a 
$300 million military aid package to India.38 
8. Reagan Administration (1981-1989) 
Initially, India’s prospects for improved relations with the Ronald Reagan 
Administration appeared gloomy.  The new administration, particularly Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig, a Kissinger protégé, had little sympathy for India.  India’s close 
relationship with the Soviet Union did not bode well.  The United States approved a $2.5 
billion aid package for Pakistan in an all-out effort to allay its security concerns. 
Having worked hard to create a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to 
improve technology transfers, its implementation tested U.S. credibility.  The MOU was 
conceived after the United States and India realized that there were too many 
impediments to cooperative ventures.  An agreement was needed that could facilitate the 
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transfer of technology to India while satisfying U.S. export requirements; it took shape in 
the form of the MOU, which was signed by the United States and India in May 1985.39 
At issue was the sale of a sophisticated Cray XMP-24 supercomputer.  India 
wanted the computer for use in atmospheric research.  The Department of State (DoS) 
and the Department of Commerce (DoC) favored the sale while the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DoE), and the National Security Agency 
(NSA) opposed the deal because the computer could also be used for code breaking.  
President Reagan had a personal interest in successful completion of the deal but 
submitted to the concerns of the NSA and allowed for the offering of a less capable 
XMP-14 in its place.  India expressed dismay with the decision but accepted it 
nonetheless. 
C.   U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR 
1. George Bush Administration (1989-1993) 
As Vice President, George Bush was instrumental in clearing the way for the 
successful completion of the U.S.-India MOU.  As President, he encountered several 
domestic roadblocks to its successful implementation.  The export review process and 
Congressional concerns delayed or impeded key technological transfers.  India continued 
to be skeptical about the sincerity and reliability of U.S. assistance. 
During the early 1990’s, there was renewed emphasis on the U.S. policy on 
nuclear nonproliferation.  This increased attention to the proliferation problem adversely 
affected U.S.-India relations.  The United States denied the export of a Combined 
Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System (CAVTS), which India sought to acquire 
for its space programs.  The United States denied the sale of CAVTS to India because of 
the dual-technology issue; it could facilitate the development of nuclear capable missile 
systems.  Similarly, in order to secure an export license, India had to give a commitment 
that the Cray XMP-22 that it requested would not be used for nuclear weapons 
development. 
During this period, certain commercial legislation passed by the United States 
Congress became irritants to U.S.-India relations.  Unhappy with the state of affairs of 
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international commercial policies, Congress enacted Paragraph 301 of the Omnibus 
Trade Competitiveness Act of 1988—also referred to as Super 301.  As a result, India 
was one of the first countries named when the first watch list was released in 1989.  
Three complaints were lodged against India, requiring the President to take retaliatory 
action: India was excluding investments from foreign companies by limiting equity 
participation to a maximum of 40 percent; the nationalization of the insurance industry in 
India denied access and adequate compensation; and the most contentious issue, India 
was lax in its protection of intellectual property rights, especially patents related to the 
pharmaceutical industry.40  The Indian government considered Super 301 another form of 
coercion. 
2.  Clinton Administration (1993-2001) 
In its early stages, the William J. Clinton Administration did not focus on South 
Asia.  The economy, Iraq, Russia, China, and North Korea were among the top issues for 
the new administration.  President Clinton’s increased stress on nonproliferation did not 
make friends in India.  The issue of nonproliferation was one of the most charged issues 
between these two countries; it may even have been the first and greatest hurdle to U.S.-
India cooperation.41 
There were basic differences between the United States and India on the issue of 
nonproliferation.  In 1995, when the NPT came up for review, the United States pushed 
for an indefinite extension while India continued to oppose to the NPT regime.  Indian 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was highly critical, renewing India’s claim that the NPT 
was a perpetuation of the efforts of a few to maintain their monopoly.42 
Also complicating the nonproliferation agenda was the issue of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  India was one of the original co-sponsors for 
the CTBT in 1993.  However, India dismayed the world when it attempted to block the 
treaty when the time came to vote in 1996.  Eventually, India refrained from blocking the 
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vote but refused to be a party to the CTBT unless it was linked to an agreement for global 
disarmament within a fixed period of time.  India thus became the main impediment in 
the CTBT’s entry into force. 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This historical review of U.S.-India relations reveals that complications occurred 
at all three levels of interaction: global, regional and individual.  The majority of the 
conflicts were a direct result of the Cold War.  For India, the largest, and most persistent 
source of conflict resulted from U.S.-Pakistan relations; the United States supported and 
armed the country that, according to India, formed its principal security threat.  For the 
United States, the primary stumbling block was the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and India. 
The first component of conflict in U.S.-India relations was the competing 
ideology at the core of each country’s foreign policy.  The United States viewed the 
world through a prism of hard realism and power politics; countries were classified as 
allies in the fight against communism, or enemies sympathetic to the communist cause. In 
many instances, U.S. foreign policy was meant to punish or coerce; the idea was to 
convince the other country to alter its behavior.  Conversely, Indian foreign policy was 
founded upon non-alignment.  After suffering through colonialism, India sought freedom 
to maneuver; it refused to be subservient to another country.  Because India remained 
true to neutralism, it did not need the United States and subsequently it was not 
susceptible to those tactics.  Only when India felt trapped between a U.S.-Pakistan-China 
bloc did it consent to an agreement with the Soviet Union. 
The second component of conflict was regional competition.  During the Cold 
War, the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan, and the United States was a 
classic zero-sum complete with an unbreakable action-reaction cycle.  If the United 
States attempted to interact with one country more than the other, the neglected country 
would cry wolf.  Most frequently, India complained of U.S. military assistance to 
Pakistan because it propped up the weaker country, emboldening Pakistan to be more 
aggressive.  In the instances when the United States attempted to treat India and Pakistan 
equally, both countries were disdainful. 
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The third component of conflict was Kashmir.  The Kashmir issue makes it 
impossible to deal with just one country, India or Pakistan.  There is a complex 
relationship that has established a delicate balance.  However, peace cannot occur without 
solving the problem, and solving the problem does not ensure peace in the region.  This 
circular logic demonstrates exactly how complicated South Asian relations are. 
The final component of conflict was the personal nature that key individuals 
injected into foreign policy.  Probably the most problematic relationship was between 
Indira Gandhi and the Nixon/Kissinger team; Indira once told an interviewer, “I think I 
had excellent relations with everybody except Mr. Nixon.  And he had made up his mind 
beforehand.”43  The dynamic between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Indian 
Ambassador to the UN Krishna Menon is another outstanding example.  Both men 
relished the opportunity to be the spokesperson for their country, and as such were prone 
to making highly provocative statements.   
However, when the key players appreciated the importance of a personal touch in 
foreign policy, relations improved.  Upon understanding the emphasis that Prime 
Minister Nehru placed personal relationships President Eisenhower reciprocated and 
relations between the two countries began to improve.  Similarly, after a chance personal 
meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Cancun the pace 
and scope of U.S.-India relations improved dramatically.  When word of the personal 
chemistry between Reagan and Indira Gandhi spread the Indo-American diplomatic 
atmosphere began to improve.44 
The result of such a long period of conflict has been a sense of mistrust.  India has 
viewed U.S. foreign policy as untrustworthy and its support unreliable; military and 
economic aid was erratic, insufficient, given to whims, and often intended to coerce.  
Similarly, the United States misread Indian silence and inactivity, interpreting as 
approval, or at least acceptance, of Soviet actions and policies.  Therefore, the United 
States was suspicious of any assistance, particularly military, offered to India because it 
feared that it would make its way into Soviet hands. 
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In order for a U.S.-India strategic partnership to endure, these complicating 
factors must be avoided.  The United States must strike a delicate balance in its South 
Asia foreign policy; it must insist that India and Pakistan continue to work towards a 
resolution of the Kashmir issue while insulating U.S.-India relations from Pakistan.  The 
end of the Cold War has made the task easier but only slightly.  U.S. relations with 
Pakistan remain a highly charged issue.  The only real difference is that personalities 
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III.  CHANGES AFFECTING U.S.-INDIACOOPERATION  
A. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years there has been an apparent resurgence of pragmatism in the 
relationship between the United States and India.  The Bush Administration is calling for 
a new strategic framework and India is responding in a positive fashion.  It appears as if 
the opportunity exists once again the United States and India to emerge as strategic 
partners.  The previous chapter revealed the conditions that have prevented this in the 
past.  Therefore, the question arises: what has changed that could facilitate success this 
time? 
This chapter assesses the current environment in an attempt to understand the 
conditions that have changed since the end of the Cold War.  The first section outlines the 
changes in ideology of both the United States and India, and how this affects U.S.-India 
relations.  The second section examines the influence of globalism on U.S.-India 
relations.  The third section discusses the new challenges in the post Cold War world and 
how the two countries are reacting. 
The end of the Cold War heralded the end of the era of global competition.  The 
mentality of competition is subsequently being replaced by one of cooperation; us versus 
them is being transformed into us and them.  Realism and balance of power politics eased 
towards the middle of the international relations spectrum and was replaced with neo-
realism and relative gains.  In the new world order, cooperation is the key to success; the 
alternative is isolation.  
B. U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR 
1. Balance of Power Arrangements Replaced by Mutual Gains 
During the Cold War period, realists dominated U.S. foreign policy.  While there 
were periods of idealism, during the Kennedy and Carter Administrations, they did not 
last long enough to create a lasting bond in the U.S.-India relations.  The end of the Cold 
War was also the end of realism. Engagement and enticements have replaced competition 
and coercion.  Differences of opinion still exist but adversarial relationships have largely 
been eliminated. 
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The current administration, and its predecessor, has moved beyond realism and 
the balance of power politics it fostered.  The new understanding is centered upon mutual 
gains and the model, especially in the George W. Bush Administration, follows that of a 
corporation.  Just as corporations must cooperate, so must countries, no single entity 
holds all of the elements critical to success. 
More and more, foreign relations resemble that of multinational corporations.  
Limited to success can be achieved on an individual basis, but true gains are achieved 
when working together towards a goal.  With the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Cold War alliance systems have become extinct.  In order to 
remain viable, NATO has been required to undergo a significant transition, which 
continues today. 
Multinational cooperative agreements and forums have replaced the old system of 
alliances.  The old structure was power based, the major powers had the largest voice and 
the smaller powers were often unheard.  The new structure is capability based, states are 
ordered by what they offer within the specific framework.  In this new structure, India, as 
a dominant regional power, has an apparent potential to play a significant role in the U.S. 
led global security and economic system. 
2. Indian Idealism Replaced by Pragmatism 
In India, pragmatism and practicality are replacing the moralism that guided 
foreign policy during the Cold War years.  During this period, Indian foreign policy 
tended to be the sole domain of the Prime Minister, especially during the tenures of 
Pandit Nehru and Indira Gandhi.  Personal influences in Indian foreign policy have also 
been reduced. 
The current government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the BJP 
approaches foreign policy in a pragmatic manner.  Prime Minister Vajpayee relies more 
closely upon his key advisors, such as Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh, Home 
Minister L. K. Advani, Defense Minister George Fernandes, and the other members of 
the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).  India still attaches many of its traditional 
values to its foreign policy, however it realizes that the key is not to be adversarial in its 
relations.  This approach has resulted in some recent foreign policy successes, e.g. India 
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successfully avoided international isolation after the May 1998 nuclear tests.  Also, 
during the 1999 India-Pakistan conflict in Kargil, Indian diplomacy succeeded in 
bringing international pressure on Pakistan to withdraw. 
C. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION 
1. Global Problems Require Global Partners 
In the new world order, a threat to one is usually a threat to all.  While this is not 
always the case, it is certainly true in the broader issues like economic development, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and energy security. 
The proliferation of WMD is now appreciated as a global threat.  In the 1980’s, 
several countries were alarmed by the events of the Iran-Iraq war, and the implications 
therein.  The United States had been stressing nonproliferation but acting only in limited 
fashion.  After the United States felt truly threatened as a result of the Gulf War, it 
increased its level of activity.  
One of the differences from the 1980’s to the 1990’s is the end of the Cold War.  
Iran and Iraq were essentially allowed to fight it out because it was a limited war, 
confined to the two states.  Because there was no threat to the U.S. or Soviet position or 
regional interests, there was no need to take action.  With the Cold War over, the Gulf 
War was billed in a different manner.  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a threat to 
energy security and thus a threat to global stability.  Therefore the Iraqi possession of 
WMD became a global concern. 
Added to this realm of global problems is terrorism.  India has been a victim of 
terrorism since the mid-1960’s.  It has worked just as long to bring the issue into 
international focus.  The United States tended to view terrorism as domestic, bilateral, 
and only occasionally as rogue actions.  This view was largely based on experience.  
Previous terrorist activities were linked to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the catholic-
protestant dispute in Northern Ireland, and the targeting of minor U.S. interests by state 
sponsored terrorists like Libya.  As a result of the enormity of the attack on 11 September 
2001, the United States changed its view of terrorism from a limited threat to a global 
one.  Currently, there is a congruence of views on the issue of terrorism between the two 
countries. 
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2. Information Technology Revolution 
The information technology (IT) revolution is one of the key driving forces 
behind globalism.  As such, India is a key player because it is a leader in IT research and 
development.  This has significantly impacted U.S.-India relations. 
Because of the IT revolution, the United States and India are inextricably linked; a 
situation that never occurred during the Cold War.  As previously stated, 40 percent of 
U.S. Fortune 500 companies outsource their software needs to Indian companies.45 
D. NEW CHALLENGES IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD 
1. Radical Influences 
The threat concept has changed.  During the Cold War, threats were country 
specific, with a global focus, like the U.S.-USSR conflict, or a regional one, like 
Argentina-Brazil.  Countries worried about other countries; the primary concern was war. 
The threat now comes from instability and uncertainty.  Countries are still 
concerned with one another, but there are additional factors that also cause concern.  Due 
to globalization a threat to one country is a concern for all.  Terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism can cause a state to falter or possibly fail, which negatively impacts the 
global economy.  Drug trafficking and illegal arms sales are also global threats.  They are 
a source of funding for terrorist activities and they are a drain on national economies, as 
the effects must be dealt with. 
2. New Approaches to the Proliferation Problem 
The Bush Administration sees a need to reevaluate the U.S. nonproliferation 
policy.  This is evident from two recent events: the abrogation of the ratification of the 
CTBT; and most recently, the withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty between the United States and Russia.  Additionally, key foreign policy advisors, 
such as Secretary of State Powell, seriously doubt the effectiveness of sanctions.  
Sanctions have been tried and failed, i.e. India and Pakistan.  Bribery has been tried, and 
is also in doubt, i.e. North Korea.  Other states, such as China and Russia, are strong 
enough that they cannot be bribed, intimidated, or coerced.  President Bush’s answer is a 
new strategic framework that is based upon a realistic assessment and acknowledgement 
of regional security threats, concerted diplomatic activity, and dialogue. 
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In recent years, the United States has begun to reevaluate nonproliferation policy.  
One significant change was the launch of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative 
(DCI) on 7 December 1993.  This was the first step in the move beyond mutually assured 
destruction (MAD).  The DCI has three primary objectives: to prevent the further 
proliferation of WMD, especially chemical and biological weapons; to prevent the usage 
of WMD; and to protect U.S. forces from the effects of WMD ensuring they can continue 
to fight in the event WMD has been used.  This was an important step because it implied 
two things.  First, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, the WMD threat had expanded 
beyond nuclear weapons and a response was required.  Secondly, it implied that 
nonproliferation was insufficient on its own.   
The most recent change in the U.S. approach to nonproliferation is embodied in 
President Bush’s new strategic framework.  The new framework has four components: 
active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses; new concepts of deterrence; 
missile defenses; further cuts in nuclear weapons.46  When speaking about the 
nonproliferation portion of the new framework, President Bush feels that the key lies in 
working together with like-minded nations. 
This is where the potential exists for the United States and India to finally begin 
to cooperate on nonproliferation.  India is willing to embark upon a cooperative effort.  It 
has expressed its support for the U.S. framework because it is similar to the ideas 
espoused by the Indian nonproliferation community, particularly because it calls for 
moving beyond the concept of MAD and reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles. 
Some experts believe that a U.S.-India strategic partnership symbolizes a change 
to nonproliferation in another manner.  By lifting sanctions and working closely with 
India, the United States is acknowledging that India is a de facto nuclear power.  This can 
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E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Much has changed in the ten years since the Cold War ended.  Many of these 
changes bode well for the improvement of U.S.-India relations.  However, despite all that 
has changed, Pakistan and Kashmir continue to be highly charged issues that have the 
potential to disrupt U.S.-India relations. 
The end of the Cold War has reduced adversarial tendencies.  The United States 
no longer needs allies to contain a threat; it requires partners to assist with economic 
growth and combating international and regional threats.  India no longer requires a 
policy of non-alignment; there are no competing power blocs.  A new reality has emerged 
in which the goal is continued economic development and the method is cooperation.  In 
this new reality, both the United States and India have demonstrated an appreciation for 
mutual gains and practicality. 
The end of the Cold War allows for a focus on global issues instead of global 
competition.  India has always pushed for resolution of the issues of non-proliferation and 
terrorism.  During the Cold War, the United States relegated non-proliferation and 
terrorism to a lesser status; they were not national interests.  Now global threats coincide 
with national interests, and United States is leading the global coalition to solve the 
problems.  
The post Cold War world has a new ordering principle, a new understanding of 
what is important, and new threats.  Because the United States and India share common 
views and interests in this new world order, the probability that they can create an 
enduring strategic partnership has improved significantly.  Finally, the United States and 
India are becoming inextricably linked.  The information technology revolution is 
currently the largest contributing factor to improved U.S.-India relations and the Indian-
American community has become a driving force in U.S. South Asia policy.    
30 
IV. INDIAN OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India is striving to improve relations with the United States.  It has made several 
significant overtures in this respect.  It has expressed support for President Bush’s new 
strategic framework.  It is supporting the United States in the war on terrorism.  And, it is 
working to enhance military-to-military cooperation.  India obviously has an ulterior 
motive in all of this, therefore the question becomes: What does India want? 
This chapter outlines the desires that India has of a strategic partnership as well as 
its concerns.  The first section examines recent media reports, academic studies, and 
white papers to determine Indian needs and the desires it has in preparation for entering 
into a strategic partnership with the United States.  The second section outlines the 
concerns that exist within sectors of the Indian government. 
India has been able to achieve reasonable success without fully aligning itself 
with either power blocs.  However, it has not been able to reach its full potential.  India 
strongly desires to continue its economic, social, and scientific development without 
sacrificing its sovereignty or its ability to act independently.  It is willing to accept 
assistance and cooperate on joint projects, but it wants to limit and closely control outside 
influences, especially the armed forces of foreign countries.  Understanding these 
concerns allows the United States to formulate policies and agreements that will 
encourage and not alienate India, thereby ensuring an enduring U.S.-India strategic 
partnership. 
B. INDIAN MOTIVATIONS FOR A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH 
THE UNITED STATES 
1. Terrorism 
India has been engaged in fighting terrorism since the mid 1960’s.  The United 
States acknowledges India’s concern with terrorism and hopes to engage India in a two-
way cooperative effort, sharing intelligence, experience, and coordinated action.  In 
February 2000, the United States and India established a Joint Working Group on 
Counter-terrorism; an interagency group of counter-terrorism and law enforcement 
officials concerned with the growing menace of international terrorism, extremism, and 
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drug trafficking.47  India hosted the second meeting of the Joint Working Group on 25-26 
September 2000 while the United States hosted the third meeting in June 2001.  
However, the only tangible product to date has been the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
clearing the way for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate with and operate an 
office in India.48  In a joint statement issued after the 5 December 2001 meeting of the 
U.S.-India Defense Planning Group (DPG), the two countries agreed to add a new 
emphasis on counter-terrorism in the area of defense cooperation.49 
While India is satisfied with bilateral assistance from the United States, it desires 
more.  Currently, India is attempting to garner support for a proposal it has made within 
the UNGA, the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.50  The concern 
within India is that when the operations against Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the 
Taliban are finished, the United States and its coalition will return to business as usual; 
leaving India to continue its struggle against cross border terrorism in the Kashmir 
region.  In the words of India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh the, “entire 
struggle (against terrorism) could not be treated as a fight against one individual or 
manifestation alone.”51  Along these lines, Islamic fundamentalism must be addressed 
because it is seen as one of the root causes for terrorism.  Drug trafficking and 
clandestine arms sales must also be tackled because they are methods used for funding 
terrorist activities. 
Finally, India also seeks assistance in combating chemical and biological 
terrorism as well as consequence management of such an attack.  In light of events 
occurring in the United States, India, through the Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO), is racing to train doctors and first responders.  The Indian 
government has been working on such issues since the Iran-Iraq war and has developed 
some protective and detection equipment most of which are defense related.  However, 
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due to World Health Organization (WHO) restrictions, there are no smallpox 
vaccinations and only the United States is reported to have an anthrax vaccine.  India is 
also considering creation of a crisis management group specific to counter-terrorism, 
modeled after the United States Office of Homeland Security.52 
2. Missile Programs 
The DRDO is the parent organization primarily responsible for the research and 
development of military hardware and systems.  Within the DRDO are a wide variety of 
facilities that conceive, design, test, and develop indigenous projects for the Indian armed 
forces.  It consists of over 50 laboratories and establishments and employs greater than 
30,000 people; there are an estimated 6,800 scientific and technical personnel within the 
DRDO.53 
One laboratory within the DRDO structure is the Defence Research and 
Development Laboratory (DRDL).  The DRDL is the principal missile research center, 
and has demonstrated considerable success along these lines.  There are those within the 
government and scientific communities that are pleased with the progress of the 
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP).  However, there are also 
those who are skeptical; the programs cost too much, and no longer meet the needs by the 
time they are fielded. 
The IGMDP consists of four core programs.  One program is the nuclear capable 
missile delivery program.  Within this program the Prithvi missile has been proven and is 
being fielded by the Indian Army and Air Force; naval testing is the next step.  
Additionally, the Agni missile and its follow-on the Agni II are now considered proven 
systems.  These developments are crucial because they support India’s goal of 
maintaining a minimum credible nuclear deterrent.   
The second program within IGMDP is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) program.  
The ongoing SAM projects are the Akash and Trishul missiles.  The third program, 
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53 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 23. 
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surface-to-surface missile (SSM), currently consists of the Nag anti-tank missile project. 
These projects are experiencing delays due to the time taken for realization of state-of-
the-art guidance and propulsion technologies.54  The fourth program is the air-to-air 
missile (AAM) program, which is beginning to engage upon a beyond visual range 
missile, Astra.55  In addition to the delays in all programs, there is skepticism regarding 
how contemporary these systems will be once they are finally fielded.56  Table 1 lists 
IGMDP projects and their status.57  Although it will be unrealistic for India to seek active 
U.S. assistance in its missile development program, India seeks the lifting of technical 
sanctions against components of dual-use technology from the United States. 
 
Table 1.   Indian Indigenous Missile Systems 
Missile Type Range(km)/payload(kg) *planned 
Remarks/Status 
Prithvi SS-150 SRBM 150/1,000 (Army version) In service 
Prithvi SS-250 SRBM 250/500 (IAF version) In development 
Agni I  IRBM 1,500/? Primarily technology demonstrator 
Agni II  IRBM 3,000*/2,200 Limited production  
Agni III  IRBM 5,000*/1,000* In development  
Surya ICBM 12,000*  Status unknown 
Dhanush SRBM 250*/500 In development, possible technology 
demonstrator 
Akash SAM 27 User trials, intended to replace SA-6 
Trishul SAM 9 User trials 
Astra AAM 100* Feasibility study authorized  
Nag Anti-tank 6 Limited production 
Brahmos 
cruise missile 
Anti-ship 300* Joint US-Russia venture 




                                                 




57 Range and status information compiled from http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/MISSILES/Missiles.html  
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3. Space Programs 
India has a functional space program in the form of the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO).  ISRO is primarily a civilian organization; it is not a part of DRDO.  
However, the two organizations work cooperatively, trading data, resources, and 
personnel.  Much of the data for IGMDP missiles is based upon the larger satellite launch 
vehicles developed by ISRO.   
ISRO maintains a network of ground tracking stations and satellites.  Currently, 
the satellites are predominantly for communications and meteorology.  While India has 
mainly utilized the satellite launch facilities of France and the United States, it has 
recently developed its own launch capabilities in the form of polar satellite launch 
vehicles (PSLV) and geosynchronous satellite launch vehicles (GSLV). 
India’s PSLV is now a proven technology.  It has launched two foreign satellites, 
KITSAT-3 of Korea and DLR TUBSAT of Germany, and is scheduled to launch two 
more, BIRD of Germany and PROBA of Belgium.58  Antrix Corporation is the 
commercial arm of ISRO and is responsible for coordinating such launches as well as 
data collection from ISRO satellites.  As a commercial entity, Antrix is a moneymaker for 
the government of India; 75 percent of Antrix’s earnings come from foreign exchange, 
turning over more than Rs 30 million.59 
However, India lacks a GSLV capability, which is a limitation.  The PSLV is only 
capable of putting objects into a stationary orbit near the earth’s poles; it lacks sufficient 
thrust to place an object in a geo-stationary orbit at a determined location.  This means 
that India is only a candidate to launch certain types of satellites.  India has been 
attempting to perfect its GSLV but has experienced setbacks.  In April 2001, an 
attempted GSLV launch was aborted and the subsequent launch data issued by 
USSPACECOM indicates that the orbit is slightly lower than a true geosynchronous 
transfer orbit (GTO); it is unclear whether this was intentional or whether it indicated a 
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slightly lower-than-nominal performance of the launch vehicle.60  Until GSLV 
technology can be perfected India is at the mercy of its foreign service providers. 
Another limitation is India’s satellite capabilities.  As previously stated, most of 
the satellites in India’s program are meant for communications or meteorology; there are 
a limited number of imaging satellites.    The imaging satellites which India now uses are 
restricted to a resolution of 5.8 meters, which is sufficient for certain commercial uses but 
of minor military value.61  This lack of intelligence gathering capability was felt when 
India failed to detect Pakistani incursions in the Kargil region of Kashmir in the summer 
of 1999.  Until India can refine its satellite imaging technology it must continue to buy 
imagery from outside sources. 
The United States and India have a history of cooperation in the field of space 
programs.  This cooperation was impacted by sanctions but can be revived and emerge as 
a model for other programs.  The following cooperative ventures have been successfully 
completed between the United States and India: 
• Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) was built in the 
1960’s and has since launched over 3000 sounding rockets for research 
purposes; 
• A bilateral agreement on an experimental Satellite Instrumental Television 
Experiment (SITE) provided television programming to 2400 Indian 
villages from an American ATS-6 satellite; 
• The United States National Aeronautical and Space Administration 
(NASA) and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) share information with ISRO allowing for collaborative research 
in earth and air sciences.62  
 
4. Energy Security 
As India continues to grow, its energy demands increase significantly.  India is 
not only growing in terms of population, its industries are growing as well.  Presently, 
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India’s primary power generation is coal-based, with thermal power generating over 80 
percent while nuclear power accounts for three percent of the total output.  The 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has completed a 2020 vision document that 
envisions 20,000 MW as the target for nuclear power production by 2020; currently, 
India produces 2,720 MW from fourteen operating units.63  The knowledge exists within 
India to complete such a task in a safe and efficient manner; however, the financing is 
currently inadequate for such an ambitious undertaking and the resource base may be 
insufficient.  Furthermore, the United States can ease the acquisition process by taking up 
India’s cause in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee.  There 
is also the potential for the construction of light-water nuclear reactors in India by 
international consortiums, led by the United States. 
5. Military Assistance 
While it is the largest of the services, and receives the biggest chunk of the 
defense budget (55.29 percent in 2000) the Indian Army has several significant 
shortfalls.64  The Directorate of Defence Policy and Planning (DDDP) recently released a 
120-page plan outlining a rapid reaction plan for India to provide a regional defense 
umbrella.65  This plan outlined future requirements for the Indian Armed Forces.  There 
is a dwindling stockpile of equipment, compounded by the fact that the equipment is also 
aging rapidly.  Also reaching the end of their life cycles are Indian armor and artillery 
assets. 
Likewise, the Indian Navy is suffering similar woes.  Only one carrier remains 
active and the remainder of the Indian fleet is aging; in order to meet future requirements 
outlined in the DDDP report, two carriers are needed in addition to the INS VIRAT.66 
While possessing sufficient forces for a conflict with Pakistan, its numbers, with the 
exception of its submarine force, are insufficient to be a truly “blue water” fleet capable 
of sea denial.  It lacks air cover, especially early warning and reconnaissance aircraft, as 
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well as anti-ship missile capabilities.67  Furthermore, India has expressed a desire to build 
its own aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine but without outside assistance 
these ventures are likely to exceed time and cost estimates by a significant amount. 
In order to meet the rapid mobility requirements the IAF needs to acquire at least 
35 long-range fast aircraft with midair refueling capabilities; three AWACS; and 200 
attack helicopter.68  The IAF has been experiencing difficulty meeting these 
requirements, especially regarding AWACS; it has rejected offers to purchase the 
Russian A-50 and its indigenous program suffered a setback when its experimental plane 
crashed.69  There is currently a deal pending between India and Israel to fill this gap. 
The IAF has other problems as well.  The advanced age of Indian aircraft is being 
blamed for a higher-than-normal accident rate, resulting in the loss of 20-25 aircraft per 
year.70  The IAF does not possess an advanced aircraft trainer, and its indigenous 
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) program has stalled forcing it to look outside the country.  
Furthermore the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program is over budget and 
overdue.  The air force is also lacking a medium-lift capability.71  Finally, Air Chief 
Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, in an April briefing, stated, “urgent requirements for operational 
and ground infrastructural upgradation,” in such areas as radar, missile, and 
communications systems.72 
In addition to the hardware requirement, the Indian armed forces seek training 
opportunities with the United States.  Discussed at the DPG, the two countries agreed that 
a plan must be completed that includes, at a minimum, training for combined 
humanitarian airlift, combined special operations training, small unit ground and air 
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exercises, naval joint personnel exchanges and familiarization, and combined naval 
training exercises between the United States Marine Corps and its Indian counterparts.73 
6. Nuclear Stability 
India seeks nuclear stability in South Asia.  This requires a mixture of cautious 
behavior, forward thinking, and accurate and timely intelligence.  Because of the 
triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan there is a delicate balance that 
must be maintained.  The Indian nuclear weapons program was initiated in response to 
the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964.  According to Pakistani officials, their nuclear program 
was in response to India’s nuclear ambitions and conventional superiority.  As it stands 
now, the three countries have seen fit to avoid an arms race, but this is not assured. 
India aspires attempting to achieve regional nuclear stability by creating a 
minimum credible nuclear deterrent.  As previously noted, the DRDO nuclear capable 
missile program is in direct support of this objective.  Another component of this 
deterrence strategy is the establishment of a nuclear triad.  Indian experts agree that a 
second strike capability is essential to support its minimum nuclear deterrent and 
consequently its no first use policy.   
India also anticipates benefits from the Bush Administration’s plan for missile 
defense.  India has stated that it supports the idea of missile defense because it revolves 
around three core concepts that are fully in tune with long-held India assumptions: 
rejection of mutual assured destruction, substantive reduction of nuclear arsenals, and 
new approaches to nonproliferation.74 
7. Other Matters 
There is also the hope that a U.S.-India strategic partnership could have other 
benefits.  There are members within the Indian government who not only desire a 
permanent seat on the UNSC; they view it as their rightful position.  It is widely 
perceived in some sections of the Indian government that a partnership with the United 
States could be a step towards this goal. 
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Having outlined several key reasons why India would seek a strategic partnership 
with the United States, the Kashmir issue remains.  This is not due to a lack of omission; 
India does not desire third party involvement in this issue.  A lingering problem since The 
Partition, India acknowledges that it cannot move forward without resolving this issue, 
but it is a matter to be settled between the affected participants.  While India does not 
desire a third party to the negotiation process, within certain circles there is hope that the 
United States can exert “influence” upon Pakistan to remain positively engaged in the 
negotiation process. 
India is on the leading edge of the information technology revolution.  It has 
become the second largest software producer in the world, and is rapidly developing 
hardware manufacturing capabilities.  In this area, India can only benefit from a strategic 
partnership with the United States.  According to Stephen Cohen, an expert on South 
Asia, “India needs American investment and technology, which it is likely to get as it 
becomes a more attractive market for American businesses as well as a critical supplier of 
software and other computer products.”75 
Now that the sanctions have been lifted, many industries and companies will 
surely benefit.  However, sixteen entities remain on a U.S. prohibitory list controlled by 
the DoC, which receives inputs from DoD and DoS.  Those entities remaining on the list, 
all subsets of DRDO, DAE, and ISRO are of strategic importance to India.  The problem 
with the entities is that they are part of the dual-use technology regime; they are deemed 
to pose an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction or 
the missiles used to deliver those weapons.76  Unless a new arrangement, similar to the 
partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom, can be achieved, these 
entities may remain on the prohibitory list. 
C. INDIAN CONCERNS 
India has a long tradition of neutrality.  Any partnership, especially one with geo-
strategic implications would violate this principle. There has only been one case in which 
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India formally signed an agreement with a Superpower, the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty.  As far as India was concerned that agreement fell short of a formal alliance, but 
only slightly.77  Furthermore, some sections of the Indian political establishment feel that 
strategic partnership with the United States would be at the cost of their historically good 
relationship with Russia. 
In the tradition of non-alignment and independent action, India is engaging in 
multiple strategic dialogues.  India has completed talks with France, which were 
described by participants as friendly and candid.  France and India have a synergy and an 
a pre-existing understanding; France made it clear when the European Union (EU) 
wanted to impose sanctions that it would support individual country sanctions but not 
collective sanctions.78  India and Australia have also completed an inaugural round of 
strategic dialogue that covered global, regional, and national security issues, defense 
policies, and arms control and disarmament.79 
There is also the fear that a strategic partnership with the United States would 
further complicate the security dilemma that it is meant to defeat.  A recognized Indian 
security analyst, Brahma Chellaney, captures this argument in the following statement 
India faces a difficult situation in Asia, one that demands deep strategic engagement with 
the United States.  India’s largest neighbor, China, will use U.S. missile defenses as an 
excuse to further modernize its already expanding nuclear and missile arsenals.  India’s 
security will be adversely affected by the increasing trans-Himalayan missile threat and 
Beijing’s continued nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan.80 
 
A large portion of the scientific community believes India does not need outside 
assistance.  India’s nuclear program is a matter of pride.  Depending upon the source 
material, India developed a nuclear bomb for one of three reasons, or a combination 
thereof: a security dilemma, a technological imperative, or a source of national pride in 
                                                 
77 Kux, Estranged Democracies, 295. 
78 The Times of India News Service, “India, France Wrap Up Strategic Dialogue,” The Times of India 
Online (02 August 2001).  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=1575862123 
79 Times News Network, “Australia, India Start Strategic Dialogue,” The Times of India Online (13 
August 2001).   http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=2068309126 
80 Brahma Chellaney, “India is Poised to Benefit from Missile Defense,” International Herald Tribune 
(11 May 2001).  https://ca.ditc.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/May2001/e20010511india.htm 
41 
the scientific community.  India has accomplished great scientific feats on its own, in 
spite of many adversities. 
The scientific tradition and pride is still in evidence.  Speaking of ISRO’s 
successful launch of the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), K. Santhanam, IDSA’s 
director, said that the launch was a significant step, and that such strategic technologies 
are a matter of do-it-yourself.81  With the launch of the TES, India now effectively has a 
spy satellite in its inventory.  The TES has a resolution of one meter coupled with a sun-
synchronous orbit, which means that it will visit the same area at the same local time 
repeatedly, allowing for the mapping of changes.82 
DRDO accomplishments match those of the ISRO in indigenous developments.  
Vasudev Kalkunte Aatre outlined Indian developments in a recent review: 
• The Army has inducted the Prithvi missile and the Air Force version has 
completed final trials.  The naval tests are next. 
• The Nag anti-tank missile will begin testing next year, with Trishul to 
follow. 
• The Brahmastra supersonic cruise missile should be ready for use by 
2003-2004. 
• The Nishant Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has cleared flight-testing 
and is awaiting orders. 
•  The Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) should be rolled out by 2003. 
• Indian naval ships have indigenous sonar systems, and submarine sonar 
systems are undergoing trials. 
• The LCA should finish operational clearance by 2006 and induction 
should occur before 2010.83 
 
Additionally, India suffered only minimal impact from the U.S. imposed 
sanctions.  Former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), R. 
Chidambaram, spoke to this issue in an exclusive interview with the Bombay Times, 
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“The sanctions had no effect at all.  In fact, during the first year of the sanctions, the 
capacity factor of our nuclear power plants increased by five per cent.  Our nuclear 
programme is completely matured, with trained people.”84  Chidambaram even went on 
to defend the Pokhran-II blasts, saying, “They were necessary for our security.  The 
entire attitude of the world has changed towards us.  In fact, sanctions gave us the 
strength in our resolve to become self-reliant.”85 
There is also uncertainty over the effect of a U.S.-India strategic partnership upon 
Indo-Pakistani relations.  The United States has long been a supporter of the Pakistani 
government.  There is some skepticism that the United States can break the old model of 
zero-sum relations when dealing with India and Pakistan.  Newly reinstated Minister of 
Defence George Fernandes is highly critical of recent U.S. efforts, especially the war on 
terrorism: 
There is yet no commitment made by the US to be part of the war that India has been 
fighting against this terrorism for over a decade, one should not, therefore rule out the 
likelihood of India having to fight its own war against terrorism on its border once the 
US-led alliance call off its engagement in Afghanistan, and goes back to its five-decade-
old cosy relationship with Pakistan.86 
 
India is concerned about military cooperation between China and Pakistan.  
Limited Sino-Pakistani cooperation has already been documented; it is widely believed 
that China was the crucial link that helped Pakistan complete its nuclear weapons 
program.  If the adage holds true that, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, then China 
and Pakistan are sure to be alarmed by a U.S.-India strategic partnership.  As a 
consequence, it is likely that China will increase its military assistance to Pakistan, which 
could cause a regional security imbalance. 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Summarizing the Indian objectives and concerns reveals the following: 
• India has a strong desire to maintain autonomy, especially with respect to 
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o Indigenous defense industry 
o Nuclear deterrence/strategic forces 
o Resolve ongoing disputes bilaterally 
• India strives to preserve the integrity of its territories 
o Maintain India’s borders 
o Resolution of the Kashmir issue 
o Defeat destabilizing outside influences 
 Terrorism 
 Islamic fundamentalism 
 Drug-trafficking 
 Piracy 
• India wishes to continue efforts to enhance South Asian stability 
o Reduce likelihood of nuclear conflict 
o Expand dialogue through regional forums such as SAARC 
• India wishes to achieve increased international standing/recognition 
o Change to NPT regime 
o CTBT 
o Permanent member of UNSC 
o Global disarmament on a fixed timeline 
• India would benefit greatly from investments in its infrastructure 
o Energy sector 
o Research and development projects 
• India seeks to modernize its military forces as well as 
o Removal of remaining technology restrictions 
o C4I 
o Doctrine and training 




V. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Bush Administration is working diligently to create a new strategic 
framework.  Within this new framework, President Bush envisions a role for India.  The 
United States will proceed with or without India, but the inclusion of India increases the 
strength and viability of the new framework.  Exactly what role does the United States 
foresee India playing? 
This chapter analyzes where the United States is going, and what it will take to 
get there with regard to India’s participation in the new framework.  The first section 
outlines the objectives of the Bush Administration at the global, regional, and national 
level.  After establishing what the objectives are, the second section delineates specific 
desires and expectations that the United States has for India.  The third section captures a 
significant portion of the concerns that exist regarding a strategic partnership with India. 
The role of India in the new strategic framework will be the same as that of other 
strategic partners: Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.  The United States primarily 
desires enhanced military-to-military cooperation, basing privileges and logistical 
support.  Knowing this, and appreciating India’s concerns, the challenge becomes 
creating a relationship that India will accept, United Kingdom model, rather than one that 
it will most likely reject, Philippine model. 
B. U.S. OBJECTIVES 
1. Global Objectives 
The goal of the Bush Administration is to move forward with a new strategic 
framework.  Within this new framework, it is the methodology and not necessarily the 
objectives that are different.  Summarizing the top U.S. geo-strategic objectives reveals 
the following: 
• The United States aims to minimize the threat, to the United States and the 
world, from WMD. 
• The United States desires to deter regional aggression and peer 
competition. 
• The United States will engage in a global war on terrorism. 
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• The United States wishes to see a stable world, free of conflict, which 
allows for economic expansion. 
• The United States will take appropriate actions to protect critical energy 
sources, as well as sea-lanes and trade routes. 
However, these goals will be achieved through global and bilateral relationships 
that are not relationships based upon win-lose or carrots and sticks; they will be 
relationships of mutual understanding and mutual benefit.  In the words of Christina 
Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs: 
We want enhanced cooperation with India to create confidence and greater transparency, 
enabling the U.S. to be more effective in helping reduce the risks of conflict or an arms 
race in the region. We believe that an overall approach of expanded engagement has the 
potential to achieve more than one based largely on habits of the past.87 
 
2. Regional Objectives 
Stability in South Asia has received increased concern because of the nuclear 
developments in the region.  It is not possible to undo the recent nuclear developments in 
South Asia; the nuclear genie has been let out of the bottle.  Now is the time to actively 
engage the problem and manage its consequences.  In the words of Robert Blackwill, 
U.S. Ambassador to India, “The United States in turn has a crucial interest in minimized 
tensions that could otherwise lead to an outbreak of hostilities or, in a worst-case 
scenario, nuclear conflict.”88  South Asian specialist, Stephen Cohen, agrees and stresses 
that, “A heightened engagement with India and Pakistan, dealing with the causes of 
regional conflict and not only its symptoms, might not only reduce the risk of war but 
also could promote important American economic, strategic, and humanitarian 
interests.”89 
India’s geographic location can play a critical role in the new U.S. National 
Military Strategy.  Currently, the only location open to U.S. forces between Singapore 
and the Persian Gulf is Diego Garcia.  Strengthening ties between the world’s two largest 
democracies facilitates greater military planning, joint operations, and eventual sharing of 
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weapons technology.90  At a minimum, a strategic partnership with India could open up 
ports, bases, and airfields as stop-over points, maintenance opportunities, refueling 
locations, or even liberty ports.  It also paves the way for joint exercises, officer 
exchanges.  ADM Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has been 
quoted as saying, “It would give us a wider range of flexibility in moving forward in 
these areas.”91 
3. National Objectives 
Now that sanctions have been removed, improving relations with India could be 
considered the primary national level objective.  Even though the sanctions have been 
lifted, much work remains to be done.  Speaking in general terms, Assistant Secretary of 
State for South Asian Affairs Christine Rocca has said, “We want enhanced cooperation 
with India to create confidence and greater transparency, enabling the U.S. to be more 
effective in helping reduce the risks of conflict or an arms race in the region.  We believe 
an overall approach of expanded engagement has the potential to achieve more than one 
based largely on habits of the past.”92  Sanctions were just a minor obstacle; their 
removal was only the first step. 
Pursuit of joint projects, particularly in the scientific and technologic arenas, is a 
long-standing goal.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently stated, “They are 
increasingly a high tech—a critical country in the high tech world—company after 
company in the United States is having a larger amount of their work done in India.”93  
President Bush has also spoken on the subject, “India has got a fantastic ability to grow, 
because her greatest export is intelligence and brain power, as our country has learned 
over the last decades.”94  Additionally, there is a growing desire to conduct joint military 
operations with India.   
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A tertiary objective is the sale of non-nuclear weapons technology.  India is, and 
has been, one of the top weapons purchasing countries for the past several years.  India is 
currently negotiating for or considering key weapons systems: 310 T-90 MBT’s from 
Russia; SU-30 aircraft production rights with Russia; TU-22M Backfire bombers from 
Russia; Russian Krasnopol laser-guided artillery rounds; Israeli Searcher-1 or Searcher-2 
UAV’s; Litening pods for the Mirage-2000; Israeli Barak SAM’s; as well as the 
possibility of purchasing AJT’s from France or Great Britain.95  Although Indian defense 
purchases have generally depended upon Russia, albeit Soviet Union, military hardware 
the DRDO effort has largely been based upon acquiring Western technologies.  Hence 
sales of weapons systems as well as research and development are another potential area 
for strengthened cooperation between the United States and India. 
C. WHAT THE UNITED STATES DESIRES FROM INDIA 
In order to achieve the objectives set forth, specific steps must be taken.  Using 
media reports, speeches and other remarks this section delineates specific items that the 
United States would like India to provide as a part of a strategic partnership.  In some 
cases, initial cooperation or a framework for cooperation exists and additional 
requirements are being assessed. 
1. Nonproliferation 
India is important to the future of nonproliferation.  India will not, and cannot, be 
included into the NPT regime.  With the exception of the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, 
India has demonstrated restraint.  It must continue to demonstrate that it is a responsible 
nuclear weapons state.    India also must promise to continue to refrain from further 
testing, in addition to its published no first-use policy. 
2.  Terrorism 
The importance of India in the war on terrorism has already been recognized.  As 
previously mentioned, the United States and India began to examine the issue in February 
2000 through the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism.  Three meetings have been 
held in the last eighteen months to discuss such topics as legal cooperation, tactics, 
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techniques, experience, and most importantly, intelligence sharing.  Indian support of 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a strong start along these lines. 
3.   Energy Security 
The Indian Ocean is vital to the world’s energy security, specifically the 
continued flow of oil from Middle East sources.  The United States and its allies receive 
up to 50 percent of their oil while Asia receives nearly 80 percent of its oil from trade 
routes that pass through the Indian Ocean.  India, too is a major importer of Middle East 
oil, 90 percent of its imports come via the Indian Ocean.    Protruding into the center of 
the Indian Ocean, India is a crucial link to the continued safety of vessels transiting from 
the Red Sea or Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, and vice versa.  India must be 
willing to cooperate in protecting these shipping lanes and the vessels that transit them. 
4. Regional Stability 
As China continues to emerge as the dominant Asian power, there is a growing 
concern both in India and the United States.  This common concern is a perfect entry 
point for a strategic partnership between two like-minded countries.  Long hostile to the 
United States, India is being enlisted to work with the United States to offer a strategic 
counterweight to China.96    India is ideally situated to have an impact upon future 
Chinese development and expansion.  The Bush Administration maintains that all 
relations are bilateral relations; no country will be viewed through the prism of another 
country.  While this is the official line, there is also an understanding that two like-
minded democracies, with vast potential as well as significant capabilities, will cooperate 
against common adversaries as a matter of mutual interest. 
5. Military Cooperation 
Military cooperation between the United States and India is the number one 
priority, as it supports the other objectives either directly or indirectly.  As such, all 
services will be involved from individual units to joint operations.  Table 3 provides a 
listing of specific U.S. interests.97 
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Table 2.   Summary of U.S. Desires for Military Cooperation 
Desire Service Remarks 
Underway Replenishment USN The USN would like support from INS tankers while 
operating in the IO, Bay of Bengal, and Arabian Sea  
Naval Escorts USN The USN would like INS ships to provide escort services 
through the Malacca Straits 
INS Task Forces USN Support of USN combat operations in the region, either 
as independent Task Force or Joint USN-INS Task Force
Repair Facilities USN The USN would like to use Indian naval repair facilities 
in order to avoid maintain forces closer to the region 
Port Facilities USN The USN would like to make port calls in India (similar 
to Australian visits) for liberty as well as logistical 
support 
Fuel Services All The United States would like to use airfields and ports 
for refueling services 
Training Facilities All The United States would like to use Indian training 
facilities as well as participate in training operations with 
Indian forces 
Staging facilities All The United States would like to be able to use Indian 
airfields and bases for staging forward deployed troops 
during combat operations 
 
 The United States and India agree that collaboration constitutes the best strategy 
for preserving security, liberty, and prosperity.98  To facilitate this collaboration, the two 
countries recently revived the DPG.  Created in 1995, the DPG is the framework for 
addressing defense cooperation between India and the United States.  Subsets of the DPG 
include: the Executive Steering Group (ESG), the Military Cooperation Group (MCG), 
and the Joint Technical Group (JTG).  As a result of the latest DPG meeting, an initial 
timeline for further sessions of all groups has been outlined through May 2002. 
6. Other Matters 
There are other issues that the United States requires India to address.  While they 
are factors outside of a strategic partnership, failure to reach a resolution could 
significantly impact cooperative efforts.  Human rights, corruption, infrastructural 
inefficiency, and trade practices are a few of the more important subjects.  Failure to 
make progress in solving these problems can have one of two effects.  Failure in the areas 
of economic reform and human rights could result in the loss of U.S. domestic support 
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for continued cooperation with India.  Also, failure in these areas could foster a loss of 
confidence in the Indian government, resulting in a new government that may not be as 
friendly and receptive to the United States.  However, there is also a dilemma that too 
much assistance from or reliance upon the United States could also negatively impact the 
position of the Indian government. 
D. U.S. CONCERNS 
India has been one of the longest and loudest critics of U.S. foreign policy.  
Starting with India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and continuing throughout 
the Cold War, India has been an opponent of U.S. foreign policy more often than a 
proponent.  India’s failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 upset 
Washington, and was viewed as being hypocritical.  India strongly opposed, and was very 
vocal about it, the war in Vietnam.  India favored recognition of the PRC, a contrary view 
to that of the United States until President Nixon shifted the policy in 1972.  India has 
always taken exception to U.S. assistance to Pakistan.    For these and a multitude of 
smaller reasons, the United States should not place such importance upon a relationship 
with India.  India must demonstrate trustworthiness before receiving such a prominent 
position in U.S. geo-strategic matters.    
 India continues to stand apart from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating 
that it creates a system of “nuclear haves” and “nuclear have-nots.”  India has tested 
nuclear weapons twice, one PNE in 1974 and five tests conducted in 1998.  Furthermore, 
India has not signed the CTBT and it continues to conduct research and development in 
the nuclear weapons field.  It also continues to seek improvements in its delivery 
capabilities, having tested the AGNI II missile in January 2001. 
India has not complied with the established norms of the nonproliferation regime, 
and as such is not deserving of a strategic partnership.  There are those who fear that such 
positive actions will undermine U.S. efforts to prevent other nations from developing 
nuclear weapons.99  It could open the door for future cases of nuclear blackmail.  
Furthermore, according to nonproliferation specialists within the DoS, it sends the wrong 
signal to the Ukraine, South Africa and other countries that have given up nuclear 
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weapons under the belief that the NPT would keep the number of nuclear weapons states 
at five.100 
 A strategic partnership with India runs the risk of upsetting the already delicate 
balance in South Asia.  The United States is involved in trying to bring Pakistan back 
from the verge of becoming a failed state.  Additionally, the United States is attempting 
to rein in the Pakistani nuclear program.  A U.S. policy that openly favors India could 
upset the relationship with Pakistan.  Should the United States enter into an important 
geo-strategic partnership with India, Pakistan will most likely turn to other countries, 
most likely China and North Korea, to help meet its security concerns.   
Chinese reaction to a U.S.-India strategic partnership is unknown, yet displeasure 
with such cooperation is a near certainty.  China is also distressed by the U. S. plans for a 
missile defense program.  China has also expressed displeasure with Indian military 
advancements.  Along these lines, the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea have 
witnessed limited naval competition between the two countries.  A significant amount of 
cooperation between the United States and India could, at a minimum, increase Chinese 
refusal to negotiate in key disagreements and, at worst, create an aggressive response 
from the PRC.  China has also, on occasion, used its military and nuclear assistance to 
Pakistan as a counterweight to the U.S. assistance of Taiwan.  A strategic partnership 
between the United States and India is likely to result in enhanced China-Pakistan 
military assistance thereby causing further regional competition and instability. 
India is not ready to play a major role in U.S. foreign policy; it must first 
overcome several key obstacles.  These key factors, external and internal, all serve to 
distract India from a global focus and thereby prevent India from being the key influential 
state in the region.   
External obstacles include: 
• India’s unsettled boundary issues prevent it from positive regional 
relations with Bangladesh and China; 
• The Kashmir issue plagues Indo-Pakistani relations preventing the two 
countries from moving forward. 
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Internal obstacles include: 
• India needs to translate its technological successes to the domestic sector, 
there is widespread poverty outside of the technical enclaves of 
Hyderabad, New Delhi, and Mumbai; 
• India needs to overcome fraud, corruption, and inefficiency within its 
basic state infrastructure; 
• India’s nationalism is incomplete, ethnic tensions continue to impede the 
maturation of the democratic system; 
• Large sectors of India’s leftist political parties are opposed to U.S.-India 
strategic partnership, which could pose problems in the event of coalition 
governments. 
While India is a democracy, the government is based on power-sharing 
arrangements that are highly susceptible to the destabilizing effects of corruption, 
bribery, and other political scandals.  The result is uncertainty whether future 
governments will honor deals struck by the present government. 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
As the Chief Executive, President Bush has established the objective.  The foreign 
policy team within the Bush Cabinet has responded by charting the path and choosing the 
tools.  Secretary of State Powell and several of his key State Department officials have 
visited South Asia to lay the groundwork.  These visits have been supported by visits 
from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Shelton.  Within the first ten months of this administration, India has received 
more official attention than it has in the past ten years. 
Also in support of the new strategic shift, the DoD conducted a top-down military 
strategy review as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process.  The threat-based, 
two major theater war strategy, has been replaced with a capability-based strategy.  
Because of the shift to a capability-based model, the United States military requires a 
stronger network of allies and friends.  The new strategy will be premised on efforts to 
strengthen America's alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security 
cooperation.  Furthermore, These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the 
political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these 
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arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is 
willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.101 
A U.S.-India strategic partnership creates a synergy of efforts in many crucial 
areas.  Nonproliferation, terrorism, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean are 
big-ticket items with broad appeal.  There will also be many small term benefits from 
such a partnership; enhanced military training as well as increased opportunities, 
intelligence sharing, basing privileges, space and missile technology, communications, 
computer hardware and software development, and energy are just a few of the outcomes.  
Furthermore, there appears to be no significant downside to a strategic partnership with 
India. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The United States and India are experiencing a convergence of interests on many 
fronts.  At the top of the list of common issues of concern are terrorism, trafficking of 
illegal drugs and weapons, Islamic fundamentalism, freedom and safety of navigation, 
and the stability of Persian Gulf oil.  India and the United States also share similar views 
on regional security, economic development, and concerns over Chinese military 
modernization.  Furthermore, the two countries desire to achieve peace and stability in 
South Asia, effective control of nuclear and missile proliferation, and the development of 
a stable and democratic Pakistan, even though they believe in different approaches to 
these problems. 
The question is whether the level of interest is sufficient enough to override past 
difficulties in order to forge a new relationship.  This thesis has analyzed the history of 
U.S.-India relations and uncovered the conditions that created the rocky relationship.  
Understanding the past complications is the first step. 
The second step of the process is to understand what has changed between the old 
and the new environment.  In this regard, this thesis has demonstrated that both countries 
have altered their thinking on many issues in the post Cold War world.  This ideological 
shift increases the probability that the United States and India can embark upon an 
enduring strategic partnership. 
The third step is uncovering what each side wants, expects, and is concerned 
about.  This thesis has uncovered the desires and concerns of each country, some general 
and some specific.  The previous steps are the foundation; this step is the ground floor.   
At the end of the day, whether or not a strategic partnership emerges depends 
entirely upon India.  The United States will move forward with its plans for a new 
strategic framework.  While India could be a crucial element of future U.S. foreign 





There historically has been a personal element to U.S.-India relations that 
determined its success or failure.  Indian leadership tends to respond positively to cordial 
relations, especially when accompanied by a personal touch.  Conversely, threats, 
unwarranted criticism, or attempts to coerce receive a negative response and jeopardize 
the relationship.  While the new Indian government, led by the BJP has largely eliminated 
personal interest from its foreign policy, friendly gestures still go a long way. 
Both countries have valid reasons to be skeptical of real progress in improving 
U.S.-India relations.  The history of relations between the United States and India is 
replete with disagreements and disappointments.  They are also right to proceed with 
caution.  The United States is concerned that technology transferred to India will not be 
closely controlled, allowing for proliferation of sensitive technologies.  Likewise, India is 
cautious about U.S. motivations. 
India recognizes the dilemma it faces.  It does not want to become a pawn in a 
larger chess game but it could benefit greatly from U.S. assistance.  In a recently 
published issue of India Today International, Prabhu Chawla captures the Indian 
perspective, there is mixed appeal, “the fear of the devastating social consequences of a 
large US troops presence,” reminiscent of South Vietnam coupled with, “large strategic 
and colossal commercial spinoffs.”102  India must balance its strong desire for autonomy 
with its desire to develop militarily, technologically, and economically. 
Much has changed in the ten years since the Cold War ended and these changes 
bode well for the improvement of U.S.-India relations.  Adversarial tendencies are being 
replaced with serious efforts at global cooperation.  Because the United States and India 
share common views and interests in this new world order, the probability that they can 
create an enduring strategic partnership has improved significantly. 
The strategic partnership must be founded upon global and regional concerns and 
not country specific.  Along these lines, India must be a full-fledged partner as opposed 
to an assistant or associate.  The process should be a gradual one.  India will not 
                                                 
102 Chawla, “War on Terror,” 15. 
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immediately offer its armed forces to a joint command; the two countries must start with 
limited objectives while expanding training opportunities and other military interactions.   
The strategic partnership must be simple, to facilitate successful negotiations, but 
multi-faceted so that all sectors may benefit.  Agreements between the United States 
should be separate entities that support a larger framework.  Both countries need the 
ability to “buy in” or “opt out” without damaging the overall effort.  Past efforts at 
cooperation failed because they were all-or-nothing arrangements.  In several areas, 
frameworks exist that must be revived and/or simplified. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Agreements between the United States and India should not be based on a quid 
pro quo arrangement.  As much as possible, arrangements should be placed into a global 
or regional context.  The emphasis should be placed on cooperation: intelligence sharing, 
to possibly include shared early-warning; and joint patrols in the Indian Ocean Basin and 
surrounding waters to protect commercial shipping from piracy are two possible entry 
points.    
Agreements should start with a small focus and work towards complexity over 
time.  An example of this concept in action would be in the realm of training.  Start with 
individuals by increasing the amount of International Military Education and Training 
(IMET).  Continue offering Indian units the use of specialized U.S. training environments 
or schools, and vice-versa.  As the two militaries become more familiar with one other 
begin to work in joint and then combined training exercises. 
The United States must demonstrate reliability and consistency in its agreements 
and policies.  India has an institutional memory; failed agreements from the past are not 
forgotten.  The successful implementation of several agreements with a small focus will 
be more effective at convincing Indian domestic opposition of U.S. trustworthiness than 
one large agreement that takes time to implement. 
The United States must attempt to understand and appreciate domestic Indian 
opposition when negotiating agreements.  As when dealing with any democracy, the 
government of India is at the mercy of its constituents.  Because India is a parliamentary 
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government, the United States must be aware of the opposition’s stance in order to avoid 
destabilizing the ruling party. 
The DPG, ESG, MCG, and JTG are the ideal forums for mapping out the future of 
a U.S.-India strategic partnership in detail.  These groups should be emulated in other 
areas of interest.  While the process of working through the various groups and levels 
may seem cumbersome, it ensures that all parties concerned have a voice and thus are 
more likely to participate. 
Finally, the most controversial recommendation is that India and Pakistan are not 
equals and should not be treated as such.  Aid to India should not be balanced with aid to 
Pakistan.  Each country has specific concerns that must be addressed individually.  The 
United States must avoid the appearance of favoring one country over the other.  In that 
regard, the United States should continue to refrain from anything other than keeping the 








AAM  Air-to-Air missile 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile 
AEC  Indian Atomic Energy Commission 
AJT  Advanced Jet Trainer 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
CAVTS Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System 
CCS  Indian Cabinet Committee on Security 
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
DAE  Indian Department of Atomic Energy 
DCI  Defense Counterproliferation Initiative 
DDDP  Indian Directorate of Defence Policy and Planning 
DoC  United States Department of Commerce 
DoD  United States Department of Defense 
DoE  United States Department of Energy 
DoS  United States Department of State 
DPG  U.S.-India Defense Planning Group 
DRDL  Indian Defence Research and Development Laboratory 
DRDO  Indian Defence Research and Development Organization 
ESG  U.S.-India Executive Steering Group 
EU  European Union 
GSLV  Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle 
GTO  Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit 
IAF  Indian Air Force 
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IGMDP Integrated Guided Missile Development Program 
INS  Indian Naval Ship 
IRBM  Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile 
ISRO  Indian Space Research Organization 
IT  Information Technology 
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JTG  U.S.-India Joint Technical Group 
LCA  Light Combat Aircraft 
MAD  Mutually Assured Destruction  
MBT  Main Battle Tank 
MCG  U.S.-India Military Cooperation Group 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NAM  Non-Aligned Movement 
NASA  United States National Aeronautical and Space Administration 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NNPA  Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 
NOAA  National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPT  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NRC  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NSA  United States National Security Agency 
NSG  Nuclear Supplier’s Group 
PNE  Peaceful Nuclear Explosive 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
PSLV  Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle 
P-5  Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council 
SAM  Surface-to-Air Missile 
SITE  Satellite Instrumental Television Experiment 
SLBM  Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLCM  Submarine Launched Cruise Missile 
SRBM  Short-range Ballistic Missile 
SSM  Surface-to-Surface Missile 
TAPS  Tarapur Atomic Power Station 
TERLS Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station 
TES  Technology Experiment Satellite 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN  United Nations 
UNCIP United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 
60 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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